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PRIVILEGED ENTRY ONTO FARM PROPERTY FOR
UNION ORGANIZERS
In the agricultural valleys of California, union workers are pres-
ently attempting to organize farm laborers.' Union efforts have been
hampered by the seasonal nature of the work, the diversity of work-
sites, and the different nationalities of the workers.2 To be success-
ful, the labor organizers must overcome these difficulties and must
contact the workers to explain to them the benefits of union organi-
zation. The most effective place to contact the laborers is on the
farms.3  However, growers are adamantly opposed to unionization
4
and have barred union representatives from their property.
This note will examine three theories under which labor organ-
izers might have access to the farms through privileged entry.
The Applicability of NLRA Cases to California Agriculture
Section 923 of the California Labor Code indicates that farm
workers have the right to organize.5 It is submitted that section
923 also entitles labor organizers to privileged entry onto a grower's
property when they are unable to contact the workers by the usual
organizational methods. The right to privileged entry developed as
the courts examined the meaning of the right to organize under the
National Labor Relations Act.0  These cases interpreting the NLRA
by analogy can be used to interpret section 923 for the following
reasons: First, California courts recognize the similarity in statutory
language between the NLRA and section 923;7 and second, California
courts interpret ldcal labor statutes by referring to NLRA cases de-
spite the specific exemptions of the NLRA.8
Section 923, giving workers the right to organize, reads in part:
The individual unorganized worker is helpless to exercise actual lib-
erty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor .... Therefore,
it is necessary that the individual workman have full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
1 Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1967, at 1, col. 3.
2 Note, Agricultural Labor Relations-The Other Farm Problem, 14 STAN.
L. REv. 120, 128 (1961).
3 See, Note, Union Right to Reply to Employer On-The-Job Speeches:
The NLRB Takes A New Approach, 61 YALE L.J. 1066, 1074-76 (1952) (dis-
cussion of advantages of union solicitation on employer's premises).
4 SENATE FACT FINDING CosmmiTTEE ON LABOR AND WELFARE, CALIFORNIA'S
FARM LABOR PROBLEMS 202, 1961 SuPP. TO THE APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF
THE SENATE [hereinafter cited as CAL. SENATE REP.].
5 1961 CAL. SENATE REP. 326 (Opinion of the California Legislative Coun-
sel No. 5162).
6 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as NLRA].
7 E.g., Messner v. Journeymen 'Barbers, Local 256, 53 Cal. 2d 873, 351
P.2d 347, 4 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1960); American Radio Ass'n v. Superior Court,
237 Cal. App. 2d 891, 47 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1965); Nahas v. Retail Clerks, Local
905, 144 Cal. App. 2d 808, 301 P.2d 932 (1956).
8 Fire Fighters, Local 1376 v. County of Merced, 204 Cal. App. 2d 387,
22 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1962).
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his own choosing, . . . and that he shall be free from interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of such representatives or in self-organization ... for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
This code section is similar in language and intent to section 157 of the
NLRA which reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection....
This similarity in language is significant because the California Su-
preme Court has held that federal cases construing a section of the
NLRA are persuasive authority if the language and the policy of the
California and the NLRA provisions are similar.9 One case so holding
is Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Local No. 88.10
In the Petri case the California court interpreted the State's
Jurisdictional Strike Act 1 by examining cases which had interpreted
the unfair labor practices section (158 (a) (1), (2)) of the NLRA. The
rules developed in the federal cases were applied to determine the
rights of the parties in the Petri case. 12 On the basis of the Petri
case, decisions interpreting section 157 of the NLRA could be used
to define the meaning of California Labor Code section 923.
However, the NLRA excludes agricultural workers from its pro-
visions.' 3 The question is whether this fact renders the NLRA cases
inapplicable to California farm workers seeking the benefits of sec-
tion 923.
In an analogous situation, a California court of appeal inter-
preted a state statute14 giving firemen the right to organize by
examining only NLRA cases. 15 Despite the fact that the NLRA ex-
cludes public employees' 6 from its guarantees, the California court
relied on these cases 17 because the NLRA' s and the California La-
bor Code' 9 contain the following identical language: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations. . . ." In effect, the court held that it is the similarity
of language and not the scope of the statutes which is determinative.
This same reasoning should apply in the case of farm workers who,
like the firemen, are exempt from the provisions of the NLRA.
20
9 Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455,
349 P.2d 76, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1960); see Fire Fighters, Local 1376 v. County
of Merced, 204 Cal. App. 2d 387, 22 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1962).
10 53 Cal. 2d 455, 349 P.2d. 76, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1960).
11 CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1115-22.
12 53 Cal. 2d 455, 459-69, 349 P.2d 76, 79:85, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 473-79 (1960).
13 NLRA § 152(3).
14 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962.
15 Fire Fighters, Local 1376 v. County of Merced, 204 Cal. App. 2d 387,
22 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1962).
16 NLRA § 152(2).
17 Fire Fighters, Local 1376 v. County of Merced, 204 Cal. App. 2d 387,
392, 22 Cal. Rptr. 270, 274 (1962).
18 NLRA § 157.
19 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1962.
20 NLRA § 152(3).
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NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Company2 ' summarizes the rules
on privileged entry which have developed under section 157 of the
NLRA. The Babcock case holds that labor organizers are entitled
to privileged entry when it is shown that the inaccessibility of the
employees prevents the organizers from reaching the workers by the
usual organizational methods. 2 The union must first make reason-
able efforts to contact the workers by distributing literature in public
places, by holding public meetings, and by mail or by telephone.
23
If these usual methods fail, the organizers are then entitled to priv-
ileged entry.24 Thus, the Babcock case defines the meaning of the
right to organize when the union is unable to contact the workers.
In Nahas v. Retail Clerks, Local 905 a California court of appeal
suggested that the Babcock case be used to interpret section 923
of the Labor Code to determine whether a union had the right to
picket on the property of a privately-owned shopping center.25 The
Nahas case recognized that the language of section 923 was similar
to the language of section 157 of the NLRA and that the policy of the
statutes was identical-the protection of the workers' right to organ-
ize.26 After Nahas, which was decided on another point, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held in the Petri case that when the statutory
language of the NLRA and the California Labor Code is similar, cases
which have defined the NLRA code section are persuasive authority
in California.
2 7
Therefore, it seems that the rules of the Babcock case can now
be applied to interpret section 923. The fact that the NLRA ex-
cludes farm workers 28 does not preclude the use of the Babcock case
when California agricultural laborers seek to enforce their rights
under section 923. As was pointed out previously, the controlling
factor is the similarity of the statutory language, not the scope of
the statutes. 29 The result is that union organizers who are unable
to contact the agricultural laborers should be allowed privileged entry
onto the grower's property.
The Company Town Doctrine
There is a constitutional right to inform people of the advantages
and disadvantages of unionization.3 0 The Supreme Court has noted
that the most effective way to inform individuals is to bring informa-
tion to their homes.3 ' In Martin v. Struthers the Court struck down
a city ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of literature
because the ordinance failed to distinguish between those who were
21 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
22 Id. at 113.
23 Id. at 111.
24 Id. at 113.
25 144 Cal. App. 2d 808, 811, 301 P.2d 932, 934 (1956).
26 Id. at 813, 301 P.2d at 936.
27 53 Cal. 2d 455, 459, 349 P.2d 76, 79, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470, 473 (1960).
28 NLRA § 152(3).
29 See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
80 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
3' Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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and those who were not willing to receive the information.3" Speak-
ing for the majority, Justice Black stated:
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he
desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free
society that, putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of
time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved.33
In Marsh v. Alabama34 the Court further defined the meaning
of the right to receive information. It held that a company could
not prevent an individual from distributing literature in a privately-
owned town.35 The Court emphasized that in order for the many
people who live in company towns to be properly informed, their
information must be uncensored.36
The company town in the Marsh case was described as having
the characteristics of a typical American town with free public ac-
cess.37 However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter at-
tacked the relevance of the free public access requirement. He stated
that since the purveyors of ideas were accorded a "preferred posi-
tion," their privileges should not depend upon a state court's notion
of the extent of dedication of private property to a public purpose.38
He believed that the technical distinctions on which a finding of
"trespass" so often depends were too tenuous to control decisions re-
garding the scope of the vital liberties guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.39 Thus, Justice Frankfurter recognized that the issue decided
in the Marsh case was that a private company, having the power of a
municipality, could not interfere with the constitutional right of the
people to receive uncensored information.
It is the daily activities of the inhabitants of any area that give
that location the characteristics of a town. An isolated village does
not cease to be a town merely because people do not enter and
leave on a daily basis. It is submitted that if the town in Marsh v.
Alabama had been closed to everyone but employees, this would not
have changed the effect of the company's actions. The company
would still be using power equivalent to that of a municipality to
censor its inhabitants' information. The following statement by the
Court would still be relevant:
Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town
the public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning
of the community in such a manner that the channels of communica-
tion remain free.40
It is the existence of the town and not free public access which en-
titles the inhabitants to receive uncensored information.
The term town has been defined as "an aggregation of inhabitants
32 319 U.S. 141 (1943); but see, Watchtowers Bible & Tract Soc'y v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 79 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S.
886 (1948).
33 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943).
34 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
35 Id. at 508; accord Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
36 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508 (1945).
37 Id. at 503.
38 Id. at 510.
39 Id. at 511.
40 Id. at 507.
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and a collection of occupied buildings. '41 In California, it is common
for farm workers to live on their employer's property.42  Not all
farms have housing facilities, but the farms that do could be said to
resemble towns. Thus, when the farmer refuses to allow labor or-
ganizers onto his property to visit the resident workers, his action is
analogous to that of the company in Marsh v. Alabama. The farmer
is performing the function of a municipality in controlling the activ-
ities on his property, and he is clearly censoring the information
which his resident workers receive. In view of this fact, the doctrine
of Marsh v. Alabama should be applied if the constitutional right of
the workers to learn about the advantages of unionization 43 is to be
sustained. By applying this doctrine to farms with a sufficient num-
ber of resident workers, the courts would be giving labor organizers
the opportunity properly to inform the workers of their right to or-
ganize.
The Multi-Use Farm
Sections 552 to 555.5 of the California Penal Code give the owners
of certain industrial property the right to post signs forbidding tres-
passing and loitering. Anyone who enters upon such posted property
without the owner's consent is guilty of a misdemeanor. 44 An excep-
tion to the trespass statute is provided by section 552.1 which states
that lawful labor organizing activities are not subject to the posted
industrial property provisions. In re Zerbe45 interpreted the meaning
of this labor exception. In that case a union official entered upon
Southern Pacific Company's right-of-way in order to picket an ad-
joining plant. He was arrested and convicted of trespassing.46  On
petition for habeas corpus, the California Supreme Court ruled that
the criminal trespass statute4 7 had to be read in conjunction with the
posted industrial property sections of the Penal Code.48 The trespass
statute was said to be subject to the labor exception.49  Moreover,
the court ruled that the legislature, in dealing with the properties
eligible to be posted, had specifically subordinated the rights of the
property owner to those of persons engaged in lawful labor activities. 50
In an earlier case, an attempt had been made to apply the labor
exception to a farm labor camp. 1 However, the court in Cotton v.
41 Siskiyou Lumber & Mercantile Co. v. Rostel, 121 Cal. 511, 513, 53 P.
1118, 1119 (1898); Klauber v. Higgins, 117 Cal. 451, 460, 49 P. 466, 467 (1897);
Ex parte Foley, 62 Cal. 508, 511 (1881); cf. Trenouth v. San Francisco, 100
U.S. 251 (1879); but see People ex Tel. Amestoy Estate Co. v. Van Nuys Light-
ing Dist., 173 Cal. 792, 796, 162 P. 97, 99 (1916).
42 1963 CAL. SENATE REP. 41-43. Statistics for seasonal workers indicate
that there are approximately 200,000 facilities for single men and 16,000 fam-
ily units in the agricultural regions of the State.
43 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
44 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 555.3.
45 60 Cal. 2d 666, 388 P.2d 182, 36 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1964).
46 Id. at 667, 388 P.2d at 183, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
47 CAL. PEN. CoDE § 602(1).
48 60 Cal. 2d at 669, 388 P.2d at 185, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
49 Id. at 669, 388 P.2d at 185, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
50 Id. at 668, 388 P.2d at 185, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
51 Cotton v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 459, 364 P.2d 241, 15 Cal. Rptr. 65
(1961).
January 1968] PRIVILEGED UNION ENTRY
Superior Court rejected this application and emphasized that the
labor exception only applied to posted industrial property and not to
farm labor camps.52
Farms, per se, are not included in the codified list of properties
capable of being posted. 53 However, a farm could be engaged in
an additional activity which does come within the posted industrial
property provisions.54 This is what is meant by a multi-use farm.
By using this concept, the entire farm might be brought within the
posted property statutes.
In order to apply the multi-use farm concept, a broad interpre-
tation of section 554 of the California Penal Code is required. There
are certain facts which indicate that such an interpretation could be
given. In the first place, section 554 of the Penal Code merely states
that if the property consists of, or is used, or is designed to be
used for any one or more of the listed activities,55 then that property
comes within the posted property provisions of the code. The land
does not have to be used for one of the activities; it is enough that
the property is designed to be used for such an activity.56 The follow-
ing list is an example of the industrial uses covered by the posted
property article:
(1) An oil well, oil field . . . used for the production, extraction,
treatment ... of oil, gas, gasoline ....
(2) Water well, dam, reservoir, pumping plant, aqueduct, canal,
tunnel, siphon, conduit ... for producing, storing, diverting, con-
serving, treating, or conveying water.
57
A great number of farms have such facilities. Hence, it is not unrea-
sonable to suggest that a multi-use farm could come within the posted
property statutes.
Secondly, in applying the labor exception 8 in Zerbe, the court
ruled that the property did not have to be involved in the labor dis-
spute for the labor exception to apply.59 In Zerbe the union trespassed
on the property of Southern Pacific Company while picketing an
adjoining plant. 0 This ruling by the California Supreme Court broad-
ened the applicability of the labor exception. This would seem to indi-
cate that the court is not insisting upon a strict interpretation of the
statute. If the court is willing to give a broad interpretation of the ac-
tivities listed in Penal Code section 554, the multi-use farm concept
could be used to apply the labor exception to a large number of farms.
However, a court reasonably could require that the major por-
tion of the property be used or designed to be used for one of the
listed activities.68 Such an interpretation would not be of assist-
ance to the labor organizers.
52 Id. at 463, 364 P.2d at 243, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
53 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 554.
54 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 552-55.5.
5G CAL. PEN. CODE § 554.
50 Id.
57 CAL. PEN. CODE § 554(a), (e).
58 CAL. PEN. CODE § 552.1.
59 60 Cal. 2d at 670, 388 P.2d at 185-86, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 288-90.
(0 Id. at 667, 388 P.2d at 184, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
61 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 554.
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An Evaluation of ihe Theories
This note has examined three theories under which farm organi-
zers might enter onto a grower's property without subjecting them-
selves to the criminal trespass statute. The reasons for such priv-
ileged entry are to inform the workers of their right to organize and
to explain to them the meaning of a labor organization.
The central question in the discussion is the proper balance be-
tween the property rights of the growers and the workers' right to
organize. Both the company town theory and the California labor
policy argument deal directly with this question, whereas the multi-
use farm theory avoids the issue. The only question in the multi-
use farm approach is whether the farm can be considered land pro-
tected by California Penal Code sections 552-55.5. If it can, then the
labor activity exception applies. On the other hand, the company
town doctrine and the California labor policy theory offer the court
the opportunity to balance the rights of the property owners with the
workers' right to organize. For this reason a decision based on one
of these two theories is more desirable.
Applying the NLRA cases6 2 to the California labor policy has
certain advantages over the company town doctrine. In the first
place, the decision would be based on California law.63 The NLRA
cases would serve as a guide to the court in interpreting the meaning
of the right to organize in California when the union is unable to
reach the workers.
Conversely, the company town doctrine rests on United States
constitutional law.64 The farmer's actions would have to be shown
to be equivalent to state action. In the Marsh case, the company
town had a post office and a shopping area.65 If a court insists that
a farm have similar facilities in addition to workers' living quarters,
the applicability of Marsh is untenable. In addition, the court would
have to accept Justice Frankfurter's conclusion that free public access
is not an essential requirement of the doctrine. It is submitted that
it is more reasonable to ask a California court to give a realistic inter-
pretation to the State's labor policy statute than it is to ask the
court not to strictly apply the requirements of Marsh v. Alabama.
Secondly, a decision based on the California labor policy would
have broader application. It would not be limited to farms with
resident workers, but could be applied to any farm where the union,
with reasonable effort, could not reach the workers through the
usual organizational methods.
The grower's argument against the application of the company
town doctrine or the California labor policy approach is based upon
his right to private property. The farmer would assert that he has
the right to exclude anyone from his premises. However, the abso-
luteness of property rights is a passing concept.6 6 Property owners
62 E.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
63 CAL. LABOR CODE § 923.
64 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
6 Id. at 503.
66 See Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil
Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 135 (1963).
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are increasingly required to be responsible to the needs of society. 7
Privileged entry for farm labor organizers would be a modifica-
tion of the grower's property rights. However, such privileged entry
would be limited to certain factual situations which now have the
effect of limiting the workers' right to organize. It does not seem
unreasonable, particularly in view of the history of the law of real
property,6 to limit the property rights of the grower in these situa-
tions. As Justice Cardozo stated:
Property, like liberty, though immune under the Constitution from
destruction, is not immune from regulation essential for the common
good. What regulation shall be, every generation must work out for
itself .... Men are saying today that property, like every other
social institution, has a social function to fulfill. 69
Patrick J. Mahoney*
67 Id. at 149.
08 Id. at 140-49.
69 CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 87 (1921).
* Member, Second Year Class.
